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Abstract
The European Semester (Semester) was implemented a decade ago. Ample research has addressed the Semester’s devel‐
opment, including some major changes in processes and content (Verdun & Zeitlin, 2018). The Covid‐19 crisis seems to
mark the next stage in the evolution of the Semester. It connects the Semester with the wider Recovery and Resilience
Facility (RRF) and links its country‐specific recommendations to conditional financial support. Thus, the next stage of the
Semester suggests a stronger and more deliberate interlinkage of different EU tools that jointly guide national socioeco‐
nomic policies. It should support both national public investment and reforms while focusing on meeting the EU priority
of moving towards a climate‐neutral, digitalized, and resilient Europe (De la Porte & Dagnis Jensen, 2021). This article
addresses the question of what room the new‐style Semester gives to the involvement of national‐level actors, such as
national parliaments. Therefore, it expands existing analytical frameworks in order to assess the RRF in connection to the
Semester, focusing on the degree of obligation, enforcement, and centralisation. Jointly, this outlines the room the RRF
gives to the participation of national actors in the Semester. The article concludes that although the national parliaments
are not mentioned in the Regulation establishing the RRF, they could claim a role both in developing national plans for
accessing financial support as well as in amending and approving reforms.
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1. Introduction
This article deals with the next stage in the evolution
of the European Semester (Semester) which is marked
by its interlinkage with the Resilience and Recovery
Facility (RRF). Tying the Semester to a new EU instru‐
ment, among others, adds conditional financial support
as a new way to drive national reforms. This article
assesses the room the Regulation establishing the RRF
(EU, 2021) leaves for national actors, in order to influ‐
ence the design and implementation of reforms, includ‐
ing reforms as suggested by the Semester’s coordination
practices. The article is structured in six parts. In the
next section, it summarises the developments in the
first decade of the Semester’s existence, emphasising
its ability to adapt to new and country‐specific goals as
well as its (growing) practice of including actors across
governance levels in the different stages of policymak‐
ing. Section 3 turns to the current development of tying
the Semester to the RRF, focusing in particular on the
quite novel instrument of using financial conditionality
as a way to drive national reforms. Section 4 gives the‐
oretical starting points for the assessment of this new
phase of the Semester, while Section 5 analyses the
Regulation establishing the RRF (in terms of the room
for stakeholder involvement) assessing the degree of
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obligation, enforcement, and centralisation. Section 6
presents the conclusions.
2. The First Decade of the Semester
The Semester may be labelled as quite an innovative gov‐
ernance model that evolves or adapts to new socioe‐
conomic challenges and governance ideas (Verdun &
Zeitlin, 2018). Its inception in 2011 was a firm reac‐
tion to the challenges posed by the large financial and
economic crisis of 2008–2013. Stricter rules on maxi‐
mum debt and deficits should improve national com‐
pliance with EU rules, while suggestions for structural
reforms should improve the economic and financial
position of member states. Accordingly, the EU rein‐
forced the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and intro‐
duced theMacro‐Economic Imbalances Procedure (MIP).
The Semester unites theMIP and the SGP, and adds social
and employment coordination. It thus creates a single
time frame for coordination activities in thewider socioe‐
conomic domain (Bekker & Klosse, 2013). Accordingly,
the Semester hosts several coordination mechanisms,
each consisting of different methods to drive or force
member state reform, including semi‐binding and non‐
binding rules, political discussions, the exchange of ideas,
scoreboards with quantitative indicators, and qualita‐
tive analyses. The result is that the degree of direct
impact of the Semester on member states depends on
the policy topic at hand, the country concerned, the
assumed urgency for reform, and the input of national
and EU‐level stakeholders (Bekker, 2021). One of the out‐
comes of the Semester is a list of country‐specific rec‐
ommendations (CSRs) which gives reform suggestions to
member states. These CSRs may stem from the SGP, MIP,
or the softer employment and social policy coordination.
During the first decade of its existence, the Semester
sparked quite fierce debates on legitimacy, national
autonomy, effectiveness, and the domination of eco‐
nomic over social goals (Chang et al., 2019; Copeland
& Daly, 2015; Crum & Merlo, 2020; De la Porte &
Heins, 2015; Vanheuverzwijn & Crespy, 2018; Verdun
& Zeitlin, 2018; Woźniakowski et al., 2021). Moreover,
quite a number of countries, those in dire need of finan‐
cial support, were taken out of the Semester coordina‐
tion activities and placed in even stricter programmes.
For instance, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Latvia, Hungary,
Romania, Cyprus, and Spain entered into bailout pro‐
grams that entailed loans upon reform conditions, laid
down in a Memorandum of Understanding (Jacoby &
Hopkin, 2020). The detrimental effects of these reforms
on both fundamental social rights and democratic stan‐
dards have been heavily criticized (Kilpatrick & de
Witte, 2014). However, non‐programme countries, that
remained in the Semester coordination cycle, such as
Italy, also received “important EU instructions with a
social focus” which put additional pressure on them to
reform (Kilpatrick & de Witte, 2014, p. 2), or faced simi‐
lar pressure to reform given their dire financial situation
(e.g., Slovenia; see Munta, 2021). It raised questions, for
instance by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe (2012), that called for a reorientation of aus‐
terity programmes in order to prevent the undermining
of democratic standards (Kilpatrick & de Witte, 2014).
Over time, the Semester adapted to the increasing
call for a more social Europe, while policymakers learned
how to engage in the Semester processes (Zeitlin &
Vanhercke, 2018). After 2015, important changes were
made to the Semester, including extending the coor‐
dination cycle to a full year. In the first semester of
each year, the European Commission proposes, and the
Council endorses, targets and guidelines. Next, in the
second Semester, policy guidance should be translated
into national policies and legislation (Papadopoulos &
Piattoni, 2018). These changes in the Semester aimed to
give national governments more time to involve national
parliaments, social partners, and other stakeholders in
discussing policy measures vis‐à‐vis national budgets
and accordingly improve national ownership (Alcidi &
Gros, 2017; Vanheuverzwijn & Crespy, 2018). Jointly, the
Semester’s characteristics of being adaptable, using a
combination of several hard and soft legal instruments,
and including actor involvement across governance lev‐
els, make the Semester hard to define when using sim‐
ple binary distinctions. Its operation lingers somewhere
between the economic and the social, the supranational
and the intergovernmental, and the technocratic and
democratic poles of EU governance (Verdun & Zeitlin,
2018). Thus, the Semester may be an excellent exam‐
ple ofmultilevel governance, involving the dynamic inter‐
action of EU‐level and national‐level actors (Cardwell &
Gaglia Bareli, 2020). National government representa‐
tives, trade unions and employers’ associations, and par‐
liaments may all play a role at the different stages of the
coordination process, influencing norm‐setting, policy
design, implementation, and evaluation. Although the
role of actors is growing, their role could be strengthened
considerably, including the role of national parliaments
(Crum, 2018; Eurofound, 2016; Munta, 2021; Sabato
et al., 2017). Also, a sense of national ownership of
the Semester seems somewhat lacking among national
stakeholders, particularly national parliaments, although
there is variation across countries (Vanheuverzwijn &
Crespy, 2018). Yet, proper stakeholder involvement could
facilitate the striking of a balance between social and eco‐
nomic goals, as well as between the national and inter‐
national views and democratic and technocratic forces.
The next section addresses what seems to be the next
stage of the Semester, as European efforts to recover
from the Covid‐19 pandemic have had an impact on
the Semester.
3. The Next Stage of the Semester
The impact of the Covid‐19 pandemic might mark
the next stage in the Semester’s evolution because
the Semester plays a role in the newly installed RRF.
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The Regulation establishing the RRF (12 February 2021)
gives member states access to grants and loans. The RRF
is part of the Next Generation EU (NGEU), the EU’s
fiscal and policy response to the Covid‐19 pandemic,
aiming to rebuild a Europe that is greener, more dig‐
ital, and more resilient. The NGEU is completely new
and set out to be a temporary recovery instrument
encompassing €750 billion (De la Porte & Dagnis Jensen,
2021). Within the NGEU, the RRF offers €672.5 billion in
loans (€360 billion) and grants (€312.5 billion) to mem‐
ber states to support their reforms and investments.
The tone with which these new instruments are intro‐
duced seems quite ‘investment’ and ‘human’ friendly,
thus contrastingwith the former ‘austerity’ recipe during
the financial crisis (Antonucci & Corti, 2020). Additionally,
it breaks with former EU ideas to avoid common debt
issuance and will create redistribution across member
states through grants (De la Porte&Dagnis Jensen, 2021).
Glancing at reactions in some of the member states,
there seems to be a great deal of political attention given
(e.g., Poland, Italy), although this does depend on the
country and its political situation (e.g., little discussion
in the Netherlands; compare Dutch Government, 2021;
Fleming et al., 2021; Kość & Tamma, 2021). Moreover, at
times countries seem to struggle with preparing stream‐
lined plans that meet the detailed expectations of the
EU, for instance on stakeholder involvement and ensur‐
ing transparency in the process (Jakubowska et al., 2021).
The RRF and the Semester are ‘intrinsically linked’
(European Commission, 2021a). In 2021, the deadlines
of the two mechanisms will overlap. Moreover, the
Semester is adjusted temporarily, releasing some of the
reporting pressure on countries. Furthermore, financial
support is conditional on reform as recommended by the
CSRs. Generally, CSRs encompass many different socioe‐
conomic policy areas, and may focus on recovery from
the crisis, but also try to address longer‐term goals such
as the EU’s Green Deal, a digital transition, and estab‐
lishing inclusive societies. In 2021, no structural CSRs will
be given to member states that have submitted national
recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs). Instead, older
CSRs play a role, meaning that member states’ reform
plans need tomeet the reform suggestions given in 2019
and 2020.
Despite these changes being presented as tempo‐
rary, the aspect of conditionality is worth exploring, as
it builds on experiments with conditionality in the past.
Moreover, tying the Semester to the RRF opens up dis‐
cussions on solidarity among member states. It creates
the need to have parliaments involved when deciding
on financial support related to the expectance of certain
(socioeconomic) reforms. Normally, financial solidarity
between member states would require enhanced input
of national parliaments, as redistributive aspects neces‐
sitate collective will‐formation, ensuring that decisions
may be justified to those who will have to deal with
the negative consequences of redistribution (Crum &
Merlo, 2020). However, previous examples of national
parliaments being bypassed and pressured into massive
reforms as a condition for loans, as happened in the bail‐
out countries during the financial and economic crisis,
raised criticism concerning the impact on fundamental
social rights and democratic standards (Kilpatrick & de
Witte, 2014). Moreover, the idea that national reforms
can be bought is quite problematic, certainly given the
national competencies and demands of the electorate
(Alcidi & Gros, 2017).
Moreover, a range of difficulties exists when steer‐
ing top‐down in complex and politically sensitive issues.
For instance, reform effects in the socioeconomic
domain are hard to predict, as well as the cause‐and‐
effect of reforms (or a lack of reforms). Some reforms
require long‐term planning in dialogue with relevant
stakeholders, making expectations of quick implemen‐
tation unrealistic and even undesired (Bekker, 2017;
Wieser, 2020). Given this complexity, the measurement
of the implementation of CSRs is likewise difficult, not
the least because CSRs often collate different priorities
and policy areas (Alcidi & Gros, 2017; Wieser, 2020). This
questions the harsh verdicts given on the low effective‐
ness of the Semester in terms of quick and complete
implementation of the reforms suggested by the CSRs.
While CSRs have not always been at the centre of atten‐
tion of national policymakers (Wieser, 2020), the pur‐
pose of the Semester is to engage in joint exploration
and recursive learning among member states and the
European Commission, on multi‐dimensional objectives,
allowing for provisional solutions to uncertain problems
in diverse national contexts (cf. Zeitlin, 2016). In the lat‐
ter case, fast and simple compliance with CSRsmight not
only be unrealistic but also is not the main purpose of
the coordination process. Rather, creating conditions for
member states to set course to meet longer‐term goals
would be the purpose, such as meeting the three 2030
headline targets agreed on at the Porto Social Summit
(May 2021): Having at least 78% of people aged 20 to 64
in employment, at least 60% of all adults participate in
training every year, and lowering the number of people
at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 mil‐
lion, including at least 5 million children. Indeed, the set‐
up of the Semester purposely includes that effects are
mediated by the national decision‐making procedures
(Crum, 2020). This allows national actors to suggest alter‐
native policy solutions to the Commission (Bekker, 2021).
The question thus is, what the impact is of tying the
Semester to the RRF, particularly on the role of national
actors. Would it make the Semester more of a suprana‐
tional structure, or would it keep valuing the Semester as
a process that lingers somewhere in‐between intergov‐
ernmental and supranational (Verdun & Zeitlin, 2018)?
Costamagna and Goldmann (2020) fear that the
availability of a large sum of money enhances the
Commission’s capacity to exercise national policy formu‐
lation, supervision, and guidance on issues that belong
to the core of national economic and social policies.
Expectations that the European Commission would not
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wait for member states to submit their NRRPs, but
rather play an active part already in their formulation
(Costamagna & Goldmann, 2020), seem to have come
true. The European Commission (2021b) says that the
NRRPs have been handed in after an ‘intensive dialogue’
between the European Commission and national author‐
ities. Spanish trade unions have complained about the
interference of the European Commission in national
social dialogue on plans for the RRF (European Trade
Union Confederation, 2021a). Thus, if the link between
the Semester and the RRF means prescribing reforms
and predicting reform effects, this would require active
attention to, and the influence of national stakeholders.
This article sheds light on the room that the Regulation
establishing the RRF offers to national stakeholders.
Therefore, it first expands existing analytical frameworks
to assess the Semester ‘new style,’ looking at the degree
of obligation, enforcement, and centralisation. Before
analysing the Regulation establishing the RRF, the next
section first gives an analytical framework in order to
structure the assessment.
4. Theory: Involvement of National‐Level Actors in
New EU Governance
Changes in EU governance during the Covid‐19 crisis
make it important to determine what changed, for
instance in terms of policies and who governed in what
ways (Schmidt, 2020). Do the changes add up to a
paradigmatic shift toward deeper European integration?
Are these changes incremental, is there a reversal toward
dis‐integration, or does it depend on the policy area at
hand (Schmidt, 2020)? Generally, new EU governance
models, such as the Semester, might be difficult to cap‐
ture using a single theory on EU integration (Hooghe &
Marks, 2019; Scharpf, 2002; Schmidt, 2018; Verdun &
Zeitlin, 2018). A combination of different theories might
be more appropriate to understand and explain all the
different mechanisms that operate in a multilevel set‐
ting where actors interact, and where different hard
and soft law norms are combined. Scharpf (2002) uses
insights from four theoretical strands for an assessment
of modes of multilevel interaction. The first is ‘mutual
adjustment,’ where national governments are makers of
their own national‐level policies. They do not do this in
isolation but may respond to the policies of other gov‐
ernments or countries. This mode leaves ample space
for national actors, such as parliaments, to influence
decision‐making. A second mode of multilevel interac‐
tion is ‘intergovernmental negotiation,’ which institution‐
alises interaction to some degree, albeit in a limited way.
Here, national governments agree to coordinate or stan‐
dardise national policies at the EU level. However, they
remain in full control of their decision‐making process,
which thus includes a role for national parliaments. In
the third and fourth modes of multilevel interaction are
‘joint decision’ and ‘hierarchical direction’ where the role
of the EU level is larger (Scharpf, 2002). Joint decision
combines elements of intergovernmental negotiation
and supranational centralisation. Hierarchical direction
centralises competencies completely to the EU‐level and
supranational actors, excluding national governments
from participation. Schmidt (2018) includes the role of
the parliament more directly in her depiction of new EU
governance. Departing fromgrand theories on EU integra‐
tion (intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and par‐
liamentarism), Schmidt (2018) calls for a widening of the
scope of analysis beyond a focus on which actor exer‐
cises which kind of power. Rather, empirical analyses
should establish which kind of power or combination of
powers are relevant in a given case, capturing elements
of politicization and dynamic interaction among both
intergovernmental and EU level actors (Schmidt, 2018).
This includes general political interests, for instance on
how national electoral politics affect EU level decision‐
making (Schmidt, 2018). This article builds on such ideas
by using an analytical framework that is nuanced enough
to distinguish degrees of more centralised and less
centralisedmultilevel interaction, evenwithin one coordi‐
nation mechanism. This is especially useful when explor‐
ing the Semester, which never becomes totally suprana‐
tional or totally national (Verdun & Zeitlin, 2018). At the
same time, depending on the topic, the country, and
the year of scrutiny, the Semester may shift to becoming
‘harder’ or ‘softer’ in its coordination (Bekker, 2021).
Building on degrees of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law coordi‐
nation, while encompassing the new element of condi‐
tional financial support (see also De la Porte & Heins,
2015), it seems worthwhile to explore the degree of
bindingness of CSRs. Developing the work of Abbott
et al. (2000), Saurugger and Terpan (2021, p. 1) judge
the nature and content of acts and norms by placing
them on a continuum. Accordingly, they define soft law
as “based on a continuum running from non‐legal posi‐
tions to legally binding and judicially controlled commit‐
ments with, in between these two opposite types of
norms, commitments that can be described as soft law.”
Two criteria, obligation and enforcement, further estab‐
lish the degree of softness of a norm. These criteria
may be complemented by the degree of centralisation,
particularly when exploring the Semester (Bekker, 2021;
De la Porte & Heins, 2015; see Table 1). The degree of
obligation arises from the nature of the act (on a scale
from hard obligation to no obligation) and the content
of the norm (the degree of clarity and/or density of a
norm). The degree of enforcement depends on whether
acts or norms within acts are submitted either to judi‐
cial control or to a very constraining form of non‐judicial
control and allows one to take into account a range of
mechanisms that ensure that actors fulfil obligations or
achieve the assigned goals. It thus includes delegation to
a third party, as well as different procedures and instru‐
ments such as guidelines, standards, and instructions
(Saurugger & Terpan, 2021). Conditional financial sup‐
port could be part of the assessment of the degree of
enforcement, which was in the case of the programme
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countries in the financial and economic crisis judged
as very high (De la Porte & Heins, 2015). The degree
of centralisation depends on whether proposed policy
changes are uncontroversial (e.g., minor vs. major policy
changes), and the degree of involvement or influence of
national actors in drafting or implementing CSRs (Bekker,
2021). De la Porte and Heins (2015, p. 7) address this
when assessing the type of objective of EU policy sug‐
gestions, letting these range from a low to a very high
degree of EU involvement. Moreover, they note that EU
policy objectives differ according to welfare state type
and policy area. Exactly these kinds of tailored policy sug‐
gestions in CSRs, their variation from year to year, as
well as the national input in the drafting stage of CSRs,
make it debatable that this feature should be placed
under the heading of centralisation (see Bekker, 2021).
After all, if a CSR were effectively drafted by a member
state, and shaped according to its national plans, that
CSR would reflect their national policy agenda rather
than the European Commission’s demands. In case of
low centralisation, national governments, parliaments,
and social partners may influence suggested reforms,
both in the phase of articulating which reforms to priori‐
tise in CSRs, and how these reforms should be designed
and implemented. More centralisation would mean less
national level influence, e.g., moving toward joint deci‐
sion or hierarchical directionmodels. Likewise, CSRs may
come across as less centrally driven if they refer to minor
policy changes in uncontroversial areas. An example of
the opposite: a large reform, would be past CSRs call‐
ing for the decentralisation of national systems of wage‐
formation (De la Porte & Heins, 2015).
The next section further explores conditional finan‐
cial support as a tool and its consequences for the degree
of pressure stemming from the Semester’s CSRs.
4.1. Analysing Conditional Financial Support
Historically, conditionality has hardly been used in the
setting of the EU (Jacoby & Hopkin, 2020). Rather,
international organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund, have used it when giving loans to coun‐
tries. In that context, conditionality may be defined
as the provision of financial assistance alongside
requirements that the debtor meet specific condi‐
tions on macroeconomic policy; thus providing bene‐
fits in exchange for implementing specific policies along
the lines spelt out by an international organisation
(Fink & Scholl, 2016, p. 176; Jacoby & Hopkin, 2020).
Conditionality should help countries to overcome the
problems that caused their dire financial situation as
well as ensure that loans are repaid. This conditionality
could limit the role of national governments and parlia‐
ments to design economic policies as they see fit.
Within the EU, conditionality has become more
prominent since the accession of ten new member
Table 1. Analytical framework for hardening and softening trends in a Semester linked to the RRF.
Element Indicators towards softening Indicators towards hardening
Obligation Codification Attaching norm to a Attaching norm to a binding
non‐binding rule: rule: Moving towards MIP
employment OMC and/or SGP
Precision Getting less precise: Getting more precise:
• Vague description; • Unambiguous rules explaining conduct they
• General standards require, authorise, or proscribe;
• Highly elaborated or dense, detailing
conditions of application, spelling out
required or proscribed behaviour
Enforcement Moving towards preventive arm Moving towards corrective arm
Less frequent policy monitoring More frequent policy monitoring
Fewer ties with conditional loans More ties with conditional loans
and grants and grants
Centralisation More national actor involvement Less national actor involvement in drafting
in drafting a norm a norm
Fit with national priorities No fit with national priorities
Uncontroversial, not challenging Far‐reaching structural reforms, undermining
institutional arrangements, minor existing institutional set‐up, requiring
policy changes fundamental change
Source: Own conceptualisation, following Bekker (2021), who builds on Abbott et al. (2000), De la Porte and Heins (2015), and Saurugger
and Terpan (2021).
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 175–185 179
states in 2004 and 2007, albeit in quite a specific
form: accession conditionality instead of crisis condi‐
tionality (Jacoby & Hopkin, 2020). Since 2008, and
directly related to the economic and financial crisis,
conditionality has been used more widely to drive
national reforms, especially in the case of the bail‐out
programmes of countries that signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with the ‘Troika’ of the European
Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
the European Commission (Theodoropoulou, 2015). This
conditionality focused on core state functions in the
fiscal, labour market, and social policy domains, and
some of the demands had already been recommended
within ‘soft’ law coordination prior to the crisis (Jacoby
& Hopkin, 2020). However, bail‐out countries were taken
out of the Semester coordination activities. Within the
Semester, the move from the preventive to the correc‐
tive arms of both the SGP and the MIP may mean pro‐
gressing soft CSRs to stricter demands. Conditionality has
also become a more prominent tool in the EU’s cohe‐
sion funds. Especially after 2014, the EU started adding
the requirement to take relevant CSRs into account
when designing national programmes, for instance allo‐
cating an appropriate amount of funding through the
European Social Fund to meeting relevant CSRs (Jacoby
& Hopkin, 2020; Viță, 2018). At present, conditional
financial support from the RRF is tied, among others,
to the CSRs, finding inspiration in the Memorandum of
Understanding used in the former crisis. It came into
the RRF following negotiations on the broader NGEU
in the European Council as part of a package of con‐
cessions. The ‘Frugals,’ a group of small, rich coun‐
tries (the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Austria),
were against debt mutualisation and higher EU budgets
(De la Porte & Dagnis Jensen, 2021; Rijksoverheid, 2020).
They accepted the RRF as an instrument in the NGEU
in exchange for a high level of conditionality for the dis‐
bursement of grants and the acceptance by Poland and
Hungary of the rule of law as a condition for receiving EU
funds (De la Porte & Dagnis Jensen, 2021).
The next section explores how conditionality, as well
as the other aspects relating to obligation, enforcement,
and centralisation, has been enshrined in the Regulation
that established the RRF, and how it took care to include
national actors, in particular the national parliament.
5. The Regulation Establishing the RRF: Obligation,
Enforcement, and Centralisation
The grants and loans in the RRF are voluntary in nature.
However, countries that have been affected more by the
crisis, might be in more need of EU funds than those that
can finance recovery themselves (Crum, 2020). For each,
a maximum of available funding has been calculated.
By 17May 2021, 18members states handed in an official
NRRP (European Commission, 2021a). The Regulation is
aware that it introduces a novelty in stimulating national
reforms. Its preamble states that as yet, there were no
instruments foreseeing direct financial support linked to
the achievement of results as well as to the implementa‐
tion of reforms and public investments ofmember states,
for instance, responding to the Semester. Moreover, the
Regulation addresses its interconnection with other pro‐
grammes and instruments more than once, for instance
referring to the EUInvest programme, other sources of
funding and the Semester, and aims to foster synergies
(Art. 28). Regarding the Semester, member states have
to hand in NRRPs, which are annexed to the Semester’s
national reform programmes. The information in these
two reports should be coherent, but there should also be
consistency with the National Energy and Climate Plans,
the EuropeanGreenDeal and the Digital Agenda, the just
transition plans, the Youth Guarantee Implementation
Plan, and the partnership agreements and operational
programmes adopted under the EU cohesion funds.
On top of that, NRRPs need to be consistent with the
Semester’s CSRs (Article 17–3 Regulation). For euro area
countries, this includes coherence with the most recent
euro area Council recommendations. Alignmentwith the
Semester also happens at the monitoring and evalua‐
tion stage. This interlinkage of the RRF with other pro‐
grammes co‐determines the reformdirection ofmember
states wanting to access grants and loans. The messages
in the CSRs are then one of the conditions for receiv‐
ing financial support, and also feed the evaluation crite‐
ria for assessing the use of the grants and loans. How
the RRF influences the degree of obligation, enforce‐
ment, and centralisation in connection to the Semester,
is explored below.
5.1. Degree of Obligation
The Regulation speaks of achieving ‘milestones’ and ‘tar‐
gets’ of reforms and investments, which need to be set
out in NRRPs, written bymember states. Suchmilestones
and targets refer to one aspect of obligation: the degree
of precision of promised reforms. This degree of preci‐
sion is substantial, and, as described above, themes are
pretty much pre‐defined. Article 17 of the Regulation,
on eligibility, mentions that NRRPs shall form a compre‐
hensive and coherent package. Article 18–4 sets out a
long list of details (covering 20 subsections from a–t).
For instance, the plan shall be duly reasoned and sub‐
stantiated, explaining how the plan contributes to the
six priority areas (or pillars) that the EU has defined in
Art. 3 of the Regulation. These priorities are a green
transition; digital transformation; smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth; social and territorial cohesion; health,
and economic, social and institutional resilience; and
policies for the next generation, children and the youth,
such as education and skills. A Commission staff work‐
ing document gives very detailed guidance and struc‐
ture for writing the NRRPs, including the elements that
the reports should cover and its coherence with EU‐level
objectives. Moreover, the NRRPs should contribute to
meeting the country‐specific challenges and CSRs (also
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if attached to the excessive imbalance procedure). This
aspect may limit the freedom of countries to design their
preferred reforms. However, CSRs may be influenced by
national actors before they are endorsed by the Council,
and moreover leave much room to further flesh out pre‐
cise reforms at the implementation stage (e.g., Zeitlin &
Vanhercke, 2018). Moreover, the Regulation offers scope
for member states to propose alternative reforms.
Additional details are requested on the distribution
of grants and loans over the EU’s priorities. Here, the EU
predetermines that at least 37% should be allocated to
the green transition and at least 20% to the digital transi‐
tion. Also, an indicative timetable for implementation, as
well as investments to be completed by 31 August 2026
should be part of the NRRPs (Art. 18–4(i)). Additionally,
referring to stakeholder inclusion, the plan should sum‐
marise the consultation process with which the mem‐
ber state included local and regional authorities, social
partners, civil society organisations, youth organisations,
and other relevant stakeholders. Interestingly, the plan
should be clear about the input of the stakeholders in the
NRRPs. Or, as the European Trade Union Confederation
(2021b, p. 27) rephrases it, governments should install
robust coordination mechanisms, both for the planning
and implementation phases, involving social partners.
The European Commission staff working document gives
more details on how the NRRPs should reflect stake‐
holder involvement, both in the design and implemen‐
tation stages. This includes:
The scope (list of consulted social partners, civil
society organisations, stakeholders etc.), the type
(conference, bilateral, tripartite etc.), and timing of
the outreach efforts and whether stakeholders have
been consulted selectively on specific components or
whether a general consultation has taken place on a
comprehensive draft plan. Member States should…
explain the envisaged steps to involve and consult the
relevant stakeholders in the implementation of the
plans overall. (European Commission, 2021c, p. 47)
Importantly, details on required stakeholder involve‐
ment also influence the degree of centralisation. This
could provide a counterweight to higher degrees of
enforcement through conditionality and a final decision‐
role of the European Council. After all, it seems logical
that stakeholder involvement in the design and imple‐
mentation phases will alter, or even improve on, any
previously agreed reform plans (see Bekker, 2021). This
flexibility and adaptability could be a feature of the
Semester that provides relevant lessons on how to judge
promised vs. actual reforms in the light of conditionality
and evaluation.
5.2. Degree of Enforcement
Regarding delegation to third actors, Art. 19 of the
Regulation gives the Commission the task of assessing
theNRRPs (or updated plans) andmaking a proposal for a
Council implementing decision. This assessment is done
in close cooperation with the member state concerned.
If the Commission requires additional information, the
member state should provide it. The Commission may
also use country information, gathered within the scope
of the Semester. If needed, the Commission could ask
a member state to revise its NRRP, as has actually hap‐
pened (e.g., Jakubowska et al., 2021). The Commission
and the member state may agree to extend the dead‐
line for assessment by a reasonable period. The plan
is checked against criteria concerning the relevance,
effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the plans.
On a proposal from the Commission, the Council shall
approve the assessment of the NRRP, via an implement‐
ing decision (Art. 20), viewing the preamble by reversed
qualified majority voting. Within this legal set‐up, the
Council thus gets the final say on approving the NRRPs
but also on stalling grants if there are deviations in
reaching milestones and targets (Corti & Nunez Ferrer,
2021; De la Porte & Dagnis Jensen, 2021). This option
also sidelines the role of the EP (Closa Montero et al.,
2021; Crum, 2020). If the Commission’s assessment of
the NRRP is positive, the proposal for an implementing
decision sets out the national reforms and investment
projects which the country needs to implement, includ‐
ingmilestones, targets, and financial contributions. If the
request concerns a loan, the Commission proposal for
a Council implementing decision shall also set out the
size of the loan and the additional reforms and invest‐
ment projects to be implemented by the member state,
including additional milestones and targets. Moreover,
the Commission shall be empowered to adopt, by the
end of December 2021, delegated acts (for an indeter‐
minate period, although this may be revoked at any
time by the European Parliament or by the Council;
Art. 29–4). This empowerment has several purposes
referring to the monitoring process, such as the creation
of common indicators for reporting progress, and for
the monitoring and evaluation of the RRF. Another pur‐
pose of having a delegated act is to define a method‐
ology for reporting social expenditure. In order to mea‐
sure progress, the Commission aims to create a resilience
scoreboard (Art. 19). There is thus quite some delegation
to the Commission and the Council, especially in terms of
assessing whether the NRRPmeets the requirements for
receiving financial support, and on monitoring progress,
with the Council having a final say. In terms of the loans
and the governance andmanagement structure, the RRF
diverts from the structural funds whose management is
shared by the national and regional authorities (Corti &
Nunez Ferrer, 2021).
Other elements of enforcement include condi‐
tional financial support and the frequency of reporting.
As described above, the conditions for grants and loans
are tied to EU level priorities, the division in the alloca‐
tion of funds, and meeting CSRs. The financial assistance
is divided into loans and grants (non‐repayable financial
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support), given in two tranches: 70% of the maximum
amount per country until 31 December 2022, and 30%
until 31 December 2023. Interestingly, apart from con‐
ditional financial support, the RRF is also tied to the
expectation that countries meet the rules on maximum
debts and deficits. Here, going from the preventive to
the corrective arm of the SGP or MIP may have con‐
sequences for the financial support given via the RRF.
Art. 10 of the Regulation deals with a Commission pro‐
posal of a (partial) suspension of the commitments or
payments if the Council decides that a member state
has not taken effective action to correct its excessive
deficit (via the SGP), or excessive imbalances (via the
MIP). Priority shall be given to the suspension of com‐
mitments, whereas payments shall be suspended only
when immediate action is sought and in the case of sig‐
nificant non‐compliance. Moreover, the scope and level
of the suspension of commitments or payment to be
imposed shall be proportionate, respect the equality of
treatment betweenmember states and take into account
the economic and social circumstances of the member
state concerned, in particular its level of unemployment,
poverty or social condition, compared to the EU average,
as well as the impact of the suspension on the national
economy. In sum, enforcement will be harsher if coun‐
tries move into the corrective arms of the SGP or the
MIP and do not take appropriate action according to
the Commission and the Council. However, the impact
of withdrawing commitments (and in second instance
payments) should also be considered.
Furthermore, the preamble of the Regulation
addresses that there should be a match between the
type of support (loan or grant) and the purpose of the
financial assistance. There should also be a match with
the costs of controls, the administrative burden, and
the expected risk of non‐compliance. Accordingly, the
non‐repayable financial support should take the form
of a sui generis Union contribution and should be paid
based on the achievement of results by reference to
milestones and targets of the NRRPs. A decision to dis‐
burse the financial contribution may be made, however.
Regarding the frequency of reporting and monitoring,
Article 27 states that themember state shall report twice
a year in the context of the Semester on the progress
made, for which also the national reform programmes
will be used.
5.3. Degree of Centralisation
Counterbalancing the enforcement aspects of the RRF
are the parts of the Regulation that explicitly give pri‐
ority to the national level. The preamble mentions
that the NRRPs should not affect the right to con‐
clude or enforce collective agreements or to take col‐
lective action. Moreover, the preamble states that the
Commission should act in close cooperation with mem‐
ber states and fully respect national ownership of the
plan, meaning that it should take into account justifica‐
tions and elements stemming from the national level.
Moreover, member states may make a reasoned request
to amend their plan within the period of implemen‐
tation, for instance, if objective circumstances justify
this. Countries may, moreover, ask the Commission to
set up exchanges with other member states in order
to share experiences within the drafting stage of their
plans (Art. 18–5). Furthermore, the preamble mentions
regional and local authorities as potentially important
partners in the implementation phase. Therefore, these
partners should be appropriately consulted and involved,
in accordance with the national legal framework. In addi‐
tion, member states should be encouraged to seek the
opinion of their national productivity boards and inde‐
pendent fiscal institutions. Expenses to hold expertmeet‐
ings and to consult stakeholders may be covered if these
relate to the preparation, design, or implementation of
the NRRP (Art. 6). The national parliaments are not men‐
tioned in the Regulation. Also, the first legislative pro‐
posals on the RRF contained a marginal role for both
the European and the national parliaments, although
a (binding) obligation on member states to let their
national parliaments approve NRRPs before submitting
them to the Commission has been recommended (Crum,
2020; Guttenberg & Nguyen, 2020).
So far, practices concerning stakeholder involvement
seem mixed. The European Trade Union Confederation
has a real‐time monitoring tool on its website, to track
down national‐level trade union involvement in the draft‐
ing and implementation of the NRRPs. It shows that
13 member states do not have such involvement (includ‐
ing those member states who, until that point, had not
yet handed in an NRRP; status May 2021). Moreover,
the European Trade Union Confederation (2021b) is
not satisfied with the quality of involvement in the
countries where trade unions were involved. It under‐
lines that whereas the attachment of the RRF to the
Semester suggests the involvement of the social part‐
ners, neither the RRF Regulation nor the Guidelines
issued by the European Commission explain how this
should take place. Therefore, the European Trade Union
Confederation provides such guidance itself to all policy
and decision‐makers.
6. Conclusion
This article deals with the next stage in the evolution of
the Semester: its interlinkage with the RFF. Apart from
linking the Semester to a new EU instrument, it adds
conditional financial support. Financial support is given
if NRRPs meet the predefined topics of the Regulation
establishing the RRF, including reform suggestions com‐
municated via the CSRs. This article analyses the degree
of obligation, enforcement, and centralisation of the
Regulation establishing the RRF. Thereby, it assesses the
room the Regulation leaves for national actors, such as
the national parliaments, to influence the design and
implementation of reforms. Using conditional financial
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support is relatively new in the EU. It was used especially
during the past financial crisis in bail‐out programmes of
some member states. This was criticised quite heavily,
in terms of it harming democratic standards and social
rights. The RRF, set up to recover from the Covid‐19
pandemic, seems to differ, advocating an investment
instead of an austerity approach. The conditionality in
the RRF also diverts from the usual conditionally of loans
used by international organisations. For instance, the
RRF acknowledges that the economic problems are not
caused by national economic policies, but rather by a
pandemic, and moreover, does not focus solely on loans,
but also gives grants.
Still, the Regulation, has quite a high degree of obli‐
gation, not in the least because the requirements for get‐
ting a grant or loan are quite precise. Also, the monitor‐
ing of results is precise, involving the checking of mile‐
stones and targets. The CSRs play a role in setting reform
expectations, but a larger set of priorities is relevant as
well. This high degree of obligation is counterbalanced
somewhat, because national governments may articu‐
late their reform ideas in NRRPs. It gives the national
level the opportunity to formulate precise reforms and
explain how this fits the national situation best. For
national parliaments and social partners, it is of key rele‐
vance that they can influence the NRRPs already at this
writing stage. On enforcement, the Commission and the
Council get quite some influence, including the ability
to set the criteria upon which a country’s progress is
measured. Commitments and payment may be revoked,
although the Regulation speaks of exceptional cases.
Particularly those countries that perpetually fail to imple‐
ment reforms under the SGP or MIP could face harsher
enforcement. However, future research should assess if
this quite strict formulation on paper will be converted
into practice. On national actor involvement, including
the national parliaments, it is important to bear in mind
the priority that the Regulation gives to the national
level, which possibly lowers the degree of centralisa‐
tion. The NRRPs should articulate how the views of a
range of national stakeholders are taken into account.
While the national parliaments are not mentioned in
the Regulation itself, the Commission’s staff working
document mentions that NRRPs may include the role
of national or regional parliaments as well as of the
social partners. The Regulation also states that alterna‐
tive reforms may be advocated, as well as amendments
to plans even at the implementation stage. All these
aspects taken together, national parliaments and other
stakeholders should be quite proactive when wanting to
exercise influence in the reform plans that are part of the
RRF. They should understand that they can be involved
at the NRRPs’ writing stage. Moreover, when debating
reform proposals in parliament, they should know that
alternative reforms may be reasoned for and that NRRPs
may be adjusted. Additionally, as the link of the Semester
to the RRF increases the relevance of the CSRs, national
stakeholders could also improve their say in designing
the CSRs, and thus influence the European Commission’s
views of reform priorities.
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